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-, /J~~n~ to-rr,~h~ Jn-vf 1'r4¥JSc.ript-
<:-f ted ~ '1 pt ~ S wrt'L ~•rrec,'f-t',.,. $, 
Tape I, pl6 
RT - There are two things that I should mention about the now of information 
both ways. It relates peripherally to this. I remember so well the j L 
statement you [ Jl4] made one time, either in a caucus or in agroup \ _ \ -
meeting of a number of De■or:rats, that it . ~i ng to he crucial ---- lL d... 
exactl)" what abuses were ide?It.ified andrthl language whitea was used to 
describe what the offenses were-that gett"ing a correct structure together 
was going to be a decisive thing. You did not indicate which way you 
~ would view it, but that ~re going to have that kind of test. I 
G ..:l1,C~~lowed some of tl'iarllangauie andon the 19th I used the phrase that it 
· "' depended upon the struetUreC)f lroDd.s being created. We were all 
fumbling for that. I talked with Sarbanes and Don Edwards and other 
people who were on the drafting committee and outlined the same 
concerns that some or · ·.us had - the abuse of power and the obstruction 
of justice. So they were aware, I think, as this was going on of the 
things that were troubling Walter and you} and me and others. 
( (.J M J 
WF - You ought to remember, I think,the Democratic c&ucus meetings, which 
. - ···· .. . l described to this group as _group the··irp1 sessions where they would 
try to make sure that everybody's thinking the sue way-"aren•t they 
••• "-and it was obvious they were trying to bring us three along 
with them. The whole purpose of the meeting was t.o get us to go along 
with their way of thinking. 
RT - But we all shared a geeat maey ideas in the prelimi.nar7 dratting. I 
know that I did, for I was ju.st fioundering, and no structure of words 
had appeared. I was trying to reach some and now we were all appraoching 
it together. 
JM - In effect we were s¢ng that we were not going to accept anr radical 
language or unprovable assertions-that type of appraoch. 
HF - In other words, ~er we got the Doar book with variations of articles 
of impeachment, you, Ray, and you, Jim, independentl)" of each other, just 
took it upon 19'll'sel ves to start drafting? 
(..,9 /.1.- c:= d - c-<" ,,,,,,_odd<c.. d - y e. s ) 
JM - Mon~ morning I met in my office with Bill Blunt, whom I had borrowed 
from Tom Geddes, a political science professor from Winthrop College, 
who was up here as an intern. 
WF - I think he was with us at that lunch deal with the Newsday gt17. 
JM - Yes, he was. He and I were tal.lcing then about drafting articles and 
on Monday morning he and John Labowicz of the impeachment staff met with 
me in ra:, office early and I le.ft him in rrry office all day, scattered all 
out on the floor- ·.and working on articles during all that day. There's 
where I got my draft of an" article that I had Tuesday morning when we 
met. As a result or their efforts I had started. 
HF - Lucky" for us you had that initiative. 
JM - Well, I don't know. 
I, p23 I 
One thing we have not emphasize enough' is the fact ve reje~d John 
Doar's and Jenner's articles. I remember that real17 interested me 
to the extent that I thought we should write the■• I thought that 
they were guilt7 of overkill. 
CB - Absolutel.7. 
HF - Don't you remember ever;rbod.7 commenting that we real.ly had to reduce 
and refine these subsections of 8.1'1)" article down to things that were 
absolutel.7 sure am provable and direct. We used the ph.ra.se that we 
cannot have s011ething where 7ou might show three or four pieces of 
evidence that supported it and someone else come forth vith three or 
four pieces of evidence that confuted it. That kind or thing we just 
couldn't have. 
TR - Sure. 
WF - That is what we meant. b7 the lowest common denominator; ve didn't 
minillua charge. We aeant. the absolute minimum, irorrclad provable. 
We wanted to docuaent it one at a time. I! we're going to impeach 
the Presidmrt., it was going to have to be on s0111e God-awful charge 
he had done something big and eno~ and terrible. It h:ad to be 
a telescoped vision rather than a ride-angled camera. 
TR - Sure. 
CB - I· ,don't think we wasted five minutes on agency. EverybodJ' agreed 
this sort of thing was out of it. 
TR - I recall a little different f'rom that. I think 7ou could have bought 
superinteru:ianey, couldn't 70u, or could 7ou [RT]? You vere about the 
~~- ~ ci· A!~~· '= I -t{."..u- -f(1_ ,~ ~&. sf~ ~ if:_ +or - .,.. 
RT - do Uh~t it neTer r\ised itse:fl to Uf7 point of consideration o,;.e,.,..... 
that the person in line for succession was a non-elected Tice- · .....s ~tJ~ • 
president.; however, I do think it lf0Uld have increased t!(6iirden, l"'-'- "';;' J 
not an unovereoma.ble increase, but it would have i.ncl"eased ~~e os 
pey;;ogical burden on me, if we had been dealing with the situation "' 
whe impeaching the President, ~ Democratic speaker o! the House O 
was going to succeed-1 'i t.m.me t.ha-t. t,e,tld hew A.ad. aa effeeci:w ~ 
l to t-ka off ,,c 0 f p,.,..,,)!--.J- · '7"-c.«, 
WF - What if Agnew vas still vice-president? What would have that done 
to us? 
CB - That would have lessened the burden some of us had. 
TR - It would have been different. 
IlS - Getting back to the point. that Walter was making before about the 
lowest c011mon. provable denominator. If 7ou were so concerned about 
getting a prov;&ble case, how is it that three days later the specificity 
thing caught everybody seemingly by surprise? 
Tape II, pl4 
TM - You will recall that on Wedne~day we got a call from Frank Polk. He 
said, "I am working on the draft o! article tvo, or SOtDething for McClor,y." 
I went out and took that meesage. 
lie - You mean article three. 
TM - It was McClor,y's own article two. 
JM - McClor,y has a letter dated July 25th, sending a copy to Caldwell Butler, 
and I'• sure to others too. That was Thursday, even before ve got back 
to article one. 
TM - There was a discussion whether or not to include Mr. MeClory or ask him 
. to join the group. It decided to send him a draft; I belieye Jimmy 
Butler attended that meeting. 
VF - Yes, your son was there. 
CB - He carried over the McCloey copy and he was greatly offended when McClor;r 
didn't co• out and get it himell, some g11-7 grabbed it out of his 
hands. 
VF - Wb7 did you gU1'S want McClor;r to come down? 
TR - The more the merrier for us. 
CB - I think we a.na.lyzed the situation and felt that he wouldn't make anr 
positive contribution to the deliberations. 
[DELETED here are six individual conaents on Mcclory]. 
TM - Going down page 5, look at C-2, the Watergate Special Prosecution lorce. 
My' recollection of the first meeting is that Mr. Thornton brought this 
up and then ve didn't have it mrt.il draft 5. 
RT - I belieye that was in IIIY' original draft. 
JiF - What do ;you mean by Water8ate Special Prosecutor? 
RT - The obstuction of Cox• s e!'fort.s to investigate the Watergate matter and 
the concern about his discharge and the other acti "Yi.ties in October. It 
was a part of a pattern that I did see that you mentioned a moment ago 
as being a continuing obstruction of justice and abuse of power which I 
did rlev as constituting a threat to om- system of gOTernment, which 
required that proceedings be brought. In that regard, rq original idea 
was to haye a single article. That vas, I belie.-e, discussed by others 
too. I did think, Bill, that it was more appropriate to have the final 
element., that of the .f'ailure to comply with the comittee' s subpoena, 
as a part of either the obstruction of justice or the abuse of power. 
1 
, 
And if you recall, as it finally turned out, I made an e.f'!ort- to tie .;.,f"c!c.M.') 
it back to article one by ameIXling that article. The reason !or [Water- ~ 
~was that it was part. o!' the continuing pattern that I thought f,· . 
~ was important• { I f l,i} 
.s,-. 'a If"""~ e cu 1-o-r- 71l... 
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1 
, 
And if 7ou recall, as it fi.nal.ly- turned out, I ude an effort, to tie ..:.c,f"c! t.hv, 
it back to article one by amending that article. The reason for rwater- ~ 
~was that it was part of the continuing pattern that I thought · · 
r" was important. 
~~Ir"~ C Gu..,..rrr 
Tape II, pl5 
TM - There was some discussion about that at' first; 1ou wanted to make 
eoverup and continuing coverup a part of it. 
RT - It relates to the idea that I had that the nature of the process of 
impeachment was a safety valve to protect our eystem of government. 
That was the reason ve had to go thru it: the danger was still there 
----- and Ulai/ it was continuing. 
TM - Back up just a moment to B-3 on page 5, wherein we talked about judicial 
proceedings and eTent~ about congressional proce~s. I recall a 
disc~sion about what we meant by judicial proceedings and we talked 
about. the grand jur;y, the trouble of connecting a President up directfy 
with the grand jur;y. Obrlou.sl,7 he never appeared before it, but the 
group, I think, spent a consdierable amount of time in talking about, 
"Can we link hi• directl.7 in these instances of counselling false 
testimoey?" There was some hesitancy to include "congressional pro-
ceedings." It got in there, but I think the group conrlnced itself 
that "judicial proceedings" was the proper tera. 
WF - We caae around to "congressional" on the basis of co-equal branches 
and the fact that we certainly occupied the sa.ae status as judicial 
proceedings, in fact an even higher one. 
CB - We talked about the couruseJJing of McGruder to perjure hiieelf with 
reference to the Senate Watergate hearings. 
JM - That's right. 
TR - Yes. 
HF - When yuu 88-7 "congressional," you were referring de!initel7 to the 
Senate Select Comnittee? 
CB - Right. 
WF - We added "approving, condoning, and acquiescing in" because we weren't 
sure that he had COllru!elled, but darn sure approved and condonetil. 
TR - Exactly. 
WF - In terms of what we had in his discussion with Dean of September 15th. 
HF - The giring forth of misleading statements to investigative offices 
is followed by- an "or," and I think that in the .first part we were 
thinking of Peterson. 
RT - Yes. 
HF - Getting information in the oval office and transmitting it. 
Tape III, p2 
TR - Now you are talking about knowledge, that' s d.if !erent.. I! he knew about 
it, then, as far as I am concerned, he had a dut7 •••• I think what we 
did was just the opposite. When you are talking about a President, when 
you are talking about impeaching somebody, throwing him out, instead or 
being reelected, I don't think that you can hold a grq resposible who 
did not have any knowledge, did not condone. [? J 
HF - But it's still obstruction of justice. 
TR - Now wait a minute. There is a distinction where he has knowledge, or 
condones or approves. 
WF - I think we put an af!irmati ve dut7 on him "to take care." I! a guy is 
going to hold himself out and be President of the United States, he has 
got s011e obligations, some affirmative obligations. 
CB - You [TR] didn't state it that strongly. 
TR - I guess I didn't. 
RT - I think it is interesting that here there is a now, just looking back 
thru the dra.rts. fhe words "course of conduct" that are used thru 
draft 5, and with draft 6, the word is "policy." 
TR - That's Doar. We wouldn't accept that. 
RT - But the interesting thing is that since the Railsback amendment was in-
troduced, it did contain a "plan" in th~ disjuctive. 
TR -
RT -
That "plan" was throwing out a bone, to be quite honest, as far as I was 
concerned. I didn't even want "plan" in there. We agreed with "plan" 
in the disjunctive "or plan." It was strictly throwing them a bone. 
~ 
vn e,n. .5 ,1,x_a_,. 
Their position was tha~t d be important to be able to prove bad, 
malicious motive - a fnal on the part of the President, and that 
there had to be more t just a course of action theoey. That had to 
be premeditation. That is what they wanted and that is why "plan" 1110re 
satisfied their position and 7et did not offend your position. 
TR - Yeah, with the disjunctive. 
WC - As I recall, when you introduced that and Wiggins and Dennis jumped on 
it, you actual.ly yielded to me to explain how come 7011 used the word 
"plan." As I recall I tried to bail you out on that and said, "You 
used the word 'plan' because that is the word the President used in 
the edited transcripts." 
TR - Sure, a very, very good job. I just read lhat last night. You did a 
good job tying that language into the edited transcripts. 
----=-
Tape IV, p7 
WF - You didn~t havea vote 
TR - Yeah, I know this. 
WF - We were with you all the way-. 
icipation. 
TR - I know you were. We had plenty debate about it, and I had discussions 
with Peter Rodino. 
WC - The questions of whether he could also go the depositions •••• 
TR - That is another one. 
CB - They abandoned depositions, so that wouldn't be •••• 
TR - Probably one or the biggest mistakes was his admaant position on calling 
four witnesses, instead of letting St.Clair leeway-. I voted with you, 
but St.Clair was, in my opinion, ju.st completel.7 reasonable on everything 
he did. He didn't want much time, he took two hours when they to_ok, 
hell, I don't know how 1118.l',;f hours presenting their thing. St~Clair was, . 
I thought, ju.st, and then when he did final.17 get his right to call wit-
nesses, he called eight or something like that. We will go back and there 
were aan;y, man;y points. I'll tell you, Peter Rodino, to his credit, 
and all of you gv;rs, and Walter almost alway-s, and the sensible Democrats 
backed off on procedural questions. 
WC - It ' s true. 
WF - That is why it was so dumb to get wrapped up in the■• 
TR - You were smart enough to see when it was gonna be a real dispute. 
could haTe been a party thing. 
~ T fu,_,,..eJ.' ~t-o ~ '/ 7 
RT - Quite the contrar.r. , 1 r 
It 
WF - That's the worst thing in the world !or .,- political position, and I 
knuw r or R87 and Jill too. 
JM - The more strongl.7 partisan you were the less you wanted it to appear so. 
TR - Yeah. The right 'bo cross-examine was another one. I got into it with 
Kastenmeier whether we meant that when we questioned the right to cross-
examine [?]. I argued that we did, because .I'd asked Jermer, "Does that 
statement have anything in there that prevents a person from cross-
exami.ning?" He said, "Of course not." 
WF - You all think that our staff did what they should have in the way of 
investigation? 
TR - Not at all. 
CB - They didn't have enough manpower. ,: 
LAUGHTER. 
. , , I 
Tape V, p2 
JM - That's right. 
TM - In your book, it is number 2. The Donahue draft is 2. This may be what 
you handed out Wednesday, before we went into the committee room at 7:30. 
JM - Yes, that was on the bottom of the resolutions, wasn't it? 
TM - About ahlf an hour before that you did hand us something. 
JM - Well, I don't recall. 
TM - You gave it to us somehat reluctantly, as I remember. You were not sure 
that 7ou wanted to do that. You did say, "Here is a rough draft or article 
II." 
JM - All right. Genera.l.17 you will notice these drafts do have a date and later 
on, as things heated up, a · time. That indicates that they were done at the 
impeachment staff offices. John Labovicz and Bill Blunt, after going over 
the latest draft with me in my office when I wou!d return fro■ one of our 
meetings, would then go over to the impeachment headquarters. John Doar 
and I had frequent discussions as I brought back from you any sugge~tions 
pertaining to eli.Jlinations. He would try. to implement. I never had any 
problem with him asserting himself on any points, except one or two iso-
lated ones, like we discovered yesterday on that business of making "his 
policy," certain things that he considered essential to sustain the le-vel 
of an impaachable offense. But basically it just was drafting. One 
other major point of difference that he and I maintained throughout was 
the question of the inclusion of the subpoena contempt as part of article 
II, rather than as a separate article. As I recall, that was the only 
point of difference that was e-ver discussed with art7 other group, and it 
was mentioned once or twice at the time of the little Democratic caucus 
meetings in Ziefll8ll • s office. I remember one inaorning in particular, in 
giving a progress report, there was concern how that should be handled 
and his opinion whether it should be second [? J. 
iiF - We all wanted it to be a part of II also, even you, Ray. 
RT - Oh, yes. 
WF - Even tho you ended up voting for it as article III. 
RT - Yes, at the time of the vote, I expressed a preference that it be in-
serted as part of article II. 
JM - Well, that is not exactly correct. I'd say we wanted it to be a part of 
article II, but you were prepared to strike it earlier. You recall the 
v -
first day we had a discssion, you [WF] and Ray in particular. 
I think that aay be right. ~•t like it at all. 




Tape V, p4 
WF - Congress and gotten the authorit)-'>-father than the courts; we were real.17~ 
acting with Rodino's subpoena, and it wasn't the whole Congress speaking 
except b;y agency there. 
TR - That's right. 
CB - We wrote him a letter. 
TR - That doesn't make arq differnce. 
WF - I retrospect, I think I would say that it is well that there was an article 
voted there. 
RT - If I ma:y speak to that, because it seems to me an import.ant part or the 
continuing violation as I saw it. The President even at the time that we 
were deliberating this was still in a position of not complying with a 
lawful request by the eomittee constituted to conduct this inquiry. And 
I think as a general matter in a legislative inqui.ey' into the executive, 
that it might be appropriate to test it in the courts. But the function 
of an impeachment:. inquiry is a dif!erent ballgame; there you are dealing 
with the very roots of' our eonstitut.ional system and there is no other 
court involved in that decision, and what the legislative bod;y is doing 
there is not a legislative function. I~ is a basic constitutional function 
and therffore its inquiry-, if' grounded upon an investigation which is to 
~n impeachable offense, itself I think should be enforced by thatbody- in 
order to get that information. Otherwise, you frustrate the constitutional 
procedure. 
WF - Basically, there was no court high enough to have jurisdiction. 
WC - That was the question that was raised as to where there is a right of 
appeal from the impeachment proceeding, and the onl.;y one who came down in 
favor of that was Rauol Berger in his book. 
TR - He said perhaps there might be a right or appeal. 
WC - Berger argued very clearly- there was. 
RT - In retrospect, the amendment that I introduced on that morning, which was 
a last-minute drafting exercise in 1111' office just before coming over there, 
I did think satisfactorily tie article III to articles I and II. It said, 
"the subpoened papers and things were deemed necessary b7 the committee 
in order to resolve by direct evidence fundamental factual questions re-
lating to presidental directions, lmowledge, or app.,oval of actions demon-
strated by other evidence to be substnatial grounds for impeachment of the 
Presid: ent." So you're tying in\the function of the subpoena directly to 
impeachable offenses. And ~then'in refusing to produce these things Richard 
M. Nixon, substitut.ing his judgment as to waht materials were necessary 
for the inquiry, interposed the powers of the presidency against the lavtul 
subpoenas of the House of Representatives, assuming to himself functions 
and judgments necessary to the exercise of the sole power o! impeachment.." 
Tape V, p8 
TR - Who is going to decide that? 
RT - The Congress. 
HF - The House. 
TR - Who normally interprets the Constitution? 
RT - The court does, but the court doesn't in cases or impeachment, because 
impeachment may include the court itself. What 11" you are impeaching the 
Chief Justice or the United States, instaed of the President? Would you ---= refer the exercise of the power or subpoena to~-court.? to the White 
House? ~ 
WF - To the executive branch? I agree with Rq there. 
CB - Even in this instance we hadn't gone that far. Ve hadn't gone to all 
the processes. 
RT - That is literally the legal argument: whether we had exhausted all the 
processes. 
TR - We had not, clearly. 
CB - That's right. 
WC - Doesn't the person, before he can be cited for contempt, have an opportunity 
to go before the House? 
TR - Yes, to make a statement. 
HF - The time, you remember, when we talked about contempt, we figured it would 
delay proceedings a year, a year and a helf. 
TR - All the safeguards normally accorded to a criminal defendant do the sair~ 
thing. 
HF - But as a practical matter, we were reluctant to put it off. 
TR - As a practical matter, we should knock ourselves out to assure that he is 
given all, if not more, of the safeguards that the ordinar;r witness who 
has to appear enjo,-s. The important thing to remember is this was a 
separate article and must stand on its own feet. Forget the Watergate 
coverup, forget the abuse of power of the sensitive agencies. Are you 
going to i111peach a guy when he asserts executive privilege and fails to 
produce? Here he is asserting executive privilege, he fails to produce, 
so instead of going thru your traditional contempt processes, you impeach 
him. That would never stand up. 
-~/ ____ ______, 
3-r_ -
Tape V, pl2 
WC - My concern was that~ had, in rq opinion, a fair and rather impartial 
investigation. Let us suppose you go back to the Johnson impeachment. 
You got people llke Benjamin Butler leading a charge against the Presid.llnt, 
not, in Z1' opinion, on valid grounds, but for purely political reasons. 
Say you have a heavy majority in Congress who is opposed to the presi-
dential policies, whether it be impound.mentor dismantelling of OEO, or 
whatever, suddenly saying, "Here are our subpoenas, ve got to bring it 
in or otherwise lllpeach you." 
JM - That's the danger. 
CB - Suppose you had two to one plus one. 
-__,.J I S t 
RT - That is exactly the hypothesis that Raoul Berger poses in discussing 
judicial review. And I want to say that your posiiion seeas to me to be 
identical with President Ford's in the Douglas case - that impeachment 
is whatever you make it. Let me tell you Berger took Ford to task th.ere. 
HF - You raise a good point, just 118.ke it two to one plus one, three to one 
totally politially hatchet job. But first of all, we do have a standard 
of what constitutes an impeachable offense, and what you're saying would 
not measure up. · 
TR - You disagree with Ford, then? 
WF - I also disagree with it. 
HF - Secondly, to see your argument, you have ·this impeachable offense vhihh 
is a crime again.st the government, the structure of the Constitution, and 
so forth. Clearly what you are saying it would not be that, but never-
theless, the Senate votes it, the trail held, and they convict the civil 
officer. Now the court of review is the pe~ple of the United States in 
the next election, as it is in so ma..ay of the things we do. You are 
posing a most extreme position, a most extreme breakdown in the civilities 
that are essential to our system. 
WF - I agree with you,Ham. The only and final recourse is the people. 
TR - Ham, you are stating the argument very well. I think it is very important. 
-wF - I think youcould have a totally" political impeachment. 
TR - Sure, that's po~sible. 
WF - When you get down to it, the system is no better than the people that are 
operating it. If you had even two to one plus one Republican, that could 
impach a Democratic President. 
CB - They would. 
00 - That was Butler for the record. 
LAUGHTER. 
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theless, the Senate votes it, the trail held, and they convict the civil 
officer. Now the court of review is the pe~ple of the United States in 
the next election, as it is in so ma.my of the things we do. You are 
posing a most extreme position, a most extreme breakdown in the civilities 
that are essential to our system. 
WF - I agree with you,Ham. The only and final recourse is the people. 
TR - Ham, you are stating the argument very well. I think it is very important. 
WF - I think youcould have a totally' political impeachment. 
TR - Sure, that's possible. 
WF - When you get down to it, the system is no better than the people that are 
operating it. If you had even two to one plus one Republican, that could 
impach a Democratic President. 
CB - They would. 
00 - That was Butler for the record. 
LAUGHTER. 
<) I 





WC - I think one other point could be made so long as we are on ttu'! light 
note, and it's the one you made last night, Ray, that all of us thought 
durimg the course of the impeachment, how in the world could someone, 
who knew he was being recorded, had his own taping system set up, and 
having engaged in the conversations he did and they did, how could they 
allow the recording to take place? Then when we compare it vith what we 
did the past day, and what we are doing now, the answer becomes rather 
clear: that these will never see the light of day. 
LAUGHTER. 
HF - I certainly want these edited before they do see the light of day. 
JM - Let's don I t fail to recall though, contrary to ·the impression that I got 
a moment ago, that there was a brief discussion concerning these matters 
in our 111eeting, because it involved the position of Rails and Walter 
with reference to whether this should be an impeachable offense, and that 
discussion caused Ray Thornton in effect to develop an amendment to article 
III, which was presented to the Democratic caucus, and I guess to the 
full committee when it was considered. 
RT - Right, and it was adopted. 
CB - It was salutary in every sense of the word. It surely did improve it. 
- ( 1 ) 
RT - What it did, Tom, once again was to tie the right to have an article based 
on a failure to comply with subpoenas to two elements: -one-, that it was 
a clearly identifiable effort to get specific evidence related to an offense 
which was l demonstrated to be an impeachable offense by other evidence. 
'"...,. s:cd ("L) 
CB - It was the finding of a jurisdictional prerequisite for impeachment. Yeah, 
that is a good one. 
JM - I just looked at article III. I don't see that language ended up in it. 
RT - Yes, it does. 
JM - Yes, I see it now. 
RT - It, ~ , was necessary in order to resolve by difect evidence factual 
questions relating to presidential direction, knowledge or approval of 
action, demonstrated by other evidence, to be substantial grounds for im-
peachment. 
JM - Right. 
WF - Frankly, it just boggled my mind that we were going to get down to what 
at the time I considered a rather technical kind of legalistic approach 
to the matter, when we were dealing with these o!fenses--am in retrospect 
I changed my position - but then these God-awful offenses like obstruction 
of justice, abuse of sensitive agencies, and things that would be politically 
sexier by back home than failure .. to comply · with a subpoena issued by a 
bunch of Democrats in the House ofRepresentati ves. And you know, how many 
times have you heard Eddie Ebert say, we got fifty subpoenas sitting on 
the Armed Services Committee, and the Congress doesn't honor suppoenas of 
the judicial branch, if they don't want to. 
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SL - I' 11 read it. This is a speech Ziefman gave 
Clara, after he had been there a while. 
WF - That is what made Rodino so damn mad. 
he University of Santa 
SL - He divides the Members into "eagles" and "chickens," and he said that 
"an eagle Rublican Congressman, Robert McClory, totally re j ected the 
smoking gun theory, and became one of the principal architects of an arti-
cle of impeachment based on the President's abuse or power. Mr. McClory 
was also the draftsman and sponsor of an article based on the President's 
defiance of the committee's subpoenas. Yet Mr. McClory vould have failed 
in his efforts without the vigorous support of such Democratic eagles as 
Jack Brobks of Texas and John Conyers of Michigan, both of vhom adamantly 
opposed any- Democratic strategy of delay as well as any effort to weaken 
the subpoena power of the comidttee." 
WC - Could you enlighten us as to what the role of Ziefman was throughout:.? 
He was always kind of in the shadows. 
TR - I don't know either. What was his role? 
WF - A kind of damn court jester, if you ask me. 
JM - Ziefman had no substantive input into the articles or into the debate or 
into the organization of the debate. Rodino might have been consulting 
with him. Ziefman would give an opinion every now and then, but it was 
always rather vague. 
WC - The press turned to him quite often, in terms of inside information as 
to what strategy was being used, what the politics were. I. · was just 
wondering if he had arry real active participation. 
JM - No, that I observed. 
f{e 
RT - Well, I think I can concur with what you have expressed. n,, was not active 
or in any way anything other than an observer with casual comments about 
the conduct of the proceedings. I think he was preoccupied with the 
Edmund Burke impeachment matter, and I think he was of a Tiew that the 
abuse of power was the central que1stion here, and he was looking for anyone 
who would support that view. But I'd go one step beyond that and say, 
without intending to be critical, that I felt that he had his feelings 
hnrt by not being in charge of the staff work, and that ma.n;r of his actions 
resulted from that feeling that he had been pushed aside in this very 
important matter. 
TR - I think you are right, without a doubt. 
JM - I got the impression that he might have done some advisir.g of Rodino on 
procedural matters and on publicity matters, but that's aboat. all I could 
see. 
RT - Yes. What's your assessment of Ziefman's role, Walter? 
_/ 
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RT - I don't think so. 
article III as it 
~~ ~--
It ·~ay be so, but I was really concerned when I saw 
appeared ready !or introduction. 
TR - It centered a.round Frank Polk. 
RT - Because it did fail to tie the pover of subpoena to an impeachment inquiry, 
I was concerned. It would have, in original form, as I recall, made the 
refusal to honor azrr congressional subpoena any time an impeachable offense, 
and this was so totally contrary to my views of the thing that I thought 
it was vital to make the change that we did make before that article was 
adopted. I would like to SB.7 that I did not feel at arr, time that there 
was arr:, restraint on me/, to go ahead and support the theory that I had that 
this was an impeachable offense and that in no v;rr was there any burden 
laid upon any of us to retreat or withdraw froa any position we felt 
strongly' about. ( MK\ 
WF - I think I was more just spent, physically' spent, on getting all up ror 
one and two, that I didn't think very hard about three. I reall7 didn',t. 
It j~ didn't measure up to what we were talking about in one and two 
in my mind at arr:, time. 
WC - What was 110~ offensive to me were McCl<'ry' s activities all the way through, 
all the caucuses we had, the closed sessions and so forth~ am then have 
him come out in favor of article III as a major proponent. And Caldwell, 
we' 11 go back to that da,. to the letter, when MeClory was opposed to holding 
him in contempt, and then raised it to a level of an impeachable offense, 
I thought was j~ too hypocritical. I did not even give it any con-
sideration other than the debate that 7ou and I had on that day. 
TR - I just like to add one thing about article II: as I see our final product, 
I do feel comfortable that we did have evidence as to all the numbered 
allegations to support our article. 
JM - There is one little point that some of you can help me vith. There was a 
crack in the coalition. And it came on article III. The little problem 
that developed, and I have not been able to recollect exactly what it was, 
but Railsback charged that there had been a breach of faith •••• 
TR - On article IV. 
RT - Article IV, the war issue, the bombing of Cambodia. 
JM - But you raised it before we voted on article III. But as I voted against 
article III for that reason. 
TR - Here is what I said, this is overkill, and in the debate on article III, I 
said, in all due respect to my esteemed colleague from lliinois, Mr. McClory, 
this is just overkill, this is not a serious offense. You [JMJ didn't make 
up your mind on article III until the last minute, because as you were 
walking by, I said, "Jim, how are )"OU going to vote on this, do you know 
yet?" And you said, "I think I am going to vote agaiast it, but I just 
made up my mind." That is when 7ou were going to your chair. 
,.,_, 
- , .-4 I,. .. . 
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WF - The only thing that was fragile was our political~ 
LAUGHTER. 
JM - I was partially motivated by a feeling that was probably based on 
Railsback's remark that there was some breach of faith asserted with 
reference to •••• 
TR - No, I never felt that at all. 
RT - I didn't realize that this division had occured. 
TR - I didn't occur. 
RT - I didn't think that it was either particularly fragile or for that matter 
really a coalition. I thuught the trouble was the word "coalition." To 
me it implies a little more wilfulness or intention. i;; ~ ""--<- ~ 
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JM - Let me engage in a little blas:the1Jy here. You are getting very close to 
sayiag that each of us, much e~er than we have admitted to ourselves, 
had a feeling that Richard Nixon had to go, that the country, that our 
system could not tolerate the growth of power, the abuse of power, the 
double-dealing, the misrepreeentations of which we were aware in various 
areas of our government. It was not specifically these two items, and 
that it was somewhat fortuitous, poetic justice, or what not, that a set 
of circumstances presented themselves which permitted us toplay a role 
in his deposition. Now, as lawyers, however, we had the ability to not 
make that move without the evidence to support it. Now I wonder if that 
doesn't express something that we can't admit even to ourselves? 
HF - As lawyers we had the ability to make that move? 
JM - No, as lawyers we had the ability to evaluate the evidence so that we would 
not effectuate our irmer feelings. 
WF - Cut the cloth to fit the pattern. 
JM - But not unless the evidence was there. And it was there. 
TR - I disagree. 
WF - I don't think I had made that judgment wuntil the evidence was there. 
That final judgment was a single decision that Richard Nixon had to go 
in order to preserve the system. That is the judgment I made, and then 
I cut the cloth. 
JM - I wouldn't say that 8.JV of us made a conscious judgment until the 
evidence was there. 
HF - My approach is a little bit different, and I think I took it more like 
Tom did, the evidence and then the judgment, and then I asked myself, 
what would be the effect of impeachment? Would the country be harmed 
by something that may be the right course of action? 
WF - But would you have then turned around and voted "No" if you had cecided 
the country would be harmed by it? 
HF - I decided that the country would not be harmed. 
WF - But had you decided the other way? 
HF - I never reached that point. 
RT - Yes, To·m,you expressed something that I feel also, and that I had worried 
about early, ·that is, within the last two or three weeks or so before 
our vote and had exprressed a worry even earlier: what if this case 
should develop so that I should become convinced as a laYfer that the 
evidence was sufficient to require a trial in the Senate in order to 
dispose of these charges, and yet I was not sure in my own mind that the 
result of that trial would lead to a conviction? What would happen if we 
were torn with the idea that wr,e ·got to have a trial to clear the charges, 
but may not be able to get a co viction in the Senate? I worried a lot 
about that, but then I aidn't ave to make that choice. 
ti~ 
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RT - If you want to justify th} charges ~tory and get"' worrying about your 
, ·tC ' individual o ortunitie~J I .... thi-nk--you-are- nattering yourself when you 
~ [+z""-J:.... . . th!nk anybody ould pay any attention to it. I am just glad that John Doar 
7.. -../,~ H41·r;;r,-:l:}3ok the time to set out the facts, and I am sorry that he did overshoot -
I 
\/V'"' ----in many instances, but ~thirikrfiij'~eatest value is in terms of history. £how ' 
It was a compilation of ta~\lecora.-'~- that it was not an impeach, ment ~ 
,,..--
that wa~ politically ~~iv~ted, but justifed ~ t~eJac~_s,-.~nd if the ~ 
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WC - But those opinions expressed 'are more important when you g-:;r- the ten •itho '~ ~ 
voted against it, saying let's make it clear for history. We did not ~ ~ 
drive Richard Nixon out of office. J 
---- - ----·- ·•-·· -- ·-·-·•· ·-•-------- - ----
CB - Would you modify the use of the word "fictitious" and say "overdrawn"? ----
RT - Overdrawn, overstated. ____ _,,..,.--
---- ------- ---- ------
DS - In your absence, Mr. Mann, there just for a moment, I 
what were your reactions to the final report of the 
says that you had some at the time. 
TM - He had a lot of input. I think he may have drafted it r 
RT- I had an input on the portion on article III. 
JM - I'm looking for the conclusio?l' of the report. 
RT - The original report language did not seem to me to sufficiently establish 
the theory that I tried to articulate, so it was necessary to correct it. 
TR - I' 11 tell you truthfully that I don't think that t he final report had much 
to do with this coalticn. By then it was all over. 
CB - My view is the same. As far as I was concerned, I was sa~ed wit h the whole 
business. 
WF - I was on the banquet circuit trying to explain what I done. 
LAUGHTER. 
WF - I hadn't thought about m:, next election until about June 27, late in the 
evening, and then I really did. 
DS - The second item here is - I have only two very poor copies unfortu."'lately 
- the June 28th letter of David Dermis, concerning tee five minute allow-
ance to all members to question witnesses. Did that play any part in your 
thinking or procedure then? 
RT - Not much. 
CB - I doubt if anybody pai d any attention to it. 
DS - Rails had said just then he thought it affected none of your tactics or 
votes. 
CB - That was Cohen. 
TM - Yes, I think Railsback and Cohen both kind of favored that. I don't think 
Mann had showed up there yet, or Flowers. There was a little panic there, 
because you [TR] were say-ing "get these down," and Cohen was always 
rattling off facts, and Railsback rattling off facts, and they looked at 
me, "Mooney, you got that down?" 
LAUGHTER. 
TM - I thought, what the hell is going on? 
WF - Froelich was there too. 
TM' - Then you [?] said·, "Damn it, we'll stay here all night if we have to, 
and we• 11 rewrite these articles and we• 11 put. in the specifics, to wit, 
and you kept it up - to wit this and to wit . . that, and write it down. 
People were running around, milling around. 
WC - We had actually debated that night what we were going to do. We had to 
go back and face those cameras again. 
WF - That's right. That was a terrifying proposition. 
WC - It sure was. 
TR - We didn't give it up though. We just hung in the:re and we just decided 
that we knew enough about it to hang in there. 
TM - But there was some discussion about going to Rodino and say since it is 
8:00 on Friday, let it stay until Monday - give us a weekend to put it 
together. 
TR - I do remember that • 
QB - He made us come back Satu...-day, didn't he? ~~ ,to~l 
RT - I wasn't there for that dinner, but as I listene¾ it seems to me that a 
very significant metamorphosis was taking place right here, that the group 
that had coine into being in order to establish a focus on the issue was 
metamorphosing into an advocacy. 
WF - Exactly. 
~ 
RT - This was what must have been ~ the minds of those people who were there. 
I was working on scme specifics myself at that time and I think I didn't 
hear about the dinner, or I would have been there. But all of us were 
undergoing a transformation from deciding our views /4ndJ working as a grouP,-
to get them ~ fl ~"te 
c--c<.11'ed 
